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This research will deal with regime dynamics (early interruption of democracies, early
maintaining of democracies, late interruption of democracies, late maintaining of democracies,
maintaining autocracies, and liberalizing autocracies), levels of democracy (liberal democracy,
electoral democracy, and hybrid regimes) and their relationship with economic growth. Regime
dynamics refers to the stability or interruption of democratic and authoritarian regime. The
meaning of the regime dynamics categories are: maintaining autocracies (countries that have
maintained their authoritarian regime over time), liberalizing autocracies (countries that are not
considered close autocracies, having some democratic aspects, such as their electoral system
with a set of minimal civil rights and freedom), late interruption democracies (countries that
became democracies after 1997 but broke down), late maintaining democracies (countries that
became democracies after 1997 and have maintained their democratic status), early interruption
democracies (countries that became democracies before 1997 but broke down), early
democratizers maintaining (countries that became democracies before 1997 and have maintained
their democratic status). These categories are created based on how these countries score in the
Freedom House. A total of 47 sub-Saharan African countries will be researched over time, from
1988 until 2008, in order to verify whether countries are included in which group of the regime
dynamics' typologies. The variable of economic growth is affected by the regime dynamics.
In this case, early maintaining democracy is positive correlated with economic growth. The
maintenance of regime, being it a democracy or an autocracy has higher growth rates compared
to countries that have democratic or autocratic interruptions. Therefore, regime stability over
time is a key variable in order to understand economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The
impact of regime dynamics and levels of democracy on economic growth has been tested by












This research will examine the dynamics affecting economic growth in sub-Saharan African
countries. Scholars and policy makers still debate about what generates and influences economic
growth. As a result, the study of economic growth is important due to several factors. First, the
approach to enhancing the understanding of what affects economic performance will improve the
capacity of policy makers and policy advisers to take decisions regarding micro and
macroeconomic policies. Second, the creation of wealth depends on the accumulation of
economic growth. As a consequence, economic growth is directly related to the generation of
material welfare that might be concentrated among a small segment of the society or distributed
among ordinary citizens through redistributive policies, such as welfare programs. It might also
lead to structural transformations of a society, favoring the creation of a more literate and
industrialized society. In the long term, socio-economic changes would increase the middle class,
reducing the number of people living in poverty. Third, the analysis of economic growth is
important because according to Adam Przeworski et al., even low income countries that are
sustaining their economic growth have increased chances to maintain their democratic system.'
Therefore, the creation and maintenance of economic growth is important for the sustainability
of democratic regimes and, in the case of Africa, it is an important goal for newly democratic
countries to achieve.
This research will deal with regime dynamics (early interruption of democracies, early
maintaining of democracies, late interruption of democracies, late maintaining of democracies,
maintaining autocracies, and liberalizing autocracies), levels of democracy (liberal democracy,
electoral democracy, and hybrid regimes) and their relationship with economic growth. Regime
dynamics refers to the stability or interruption of democratic and authoritarian regime. The
meaning of the regime dynamics categories are: maintaining autocracies (countries that have
maintained their authoritarian regime over time), liberalizing autocracies (countries that are not
'Adam Przeworski, et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World,1950-











considered close autocracies, having some democratic aspects, such as their electoral system
with a set of minimal civil rights and freedom), late interruption democracies (countries that
became democracies after 1997 but broke down), late maintaining democracies (countries that
became democracies after 1997 and have maintained their democratic status), early interruption
democracies (countries that became democracies before 1997 but broke down), early
democratizers maintaining (countries that became democracies before 1997 and have maintained
their democratic status). These categories are created based on how these countries score in the
Freedom House Index. A total of 47 sub-Saharan African countries will be researched over time,
from 1988 until 2008, in order to verify which countries are included in which group of the
regime dynamics' typologies. The variable of economic growth is affected by the regime
dynamics. In this case, early maintaining democracy is positive correlated with economic
growth. Two quantitative techniques will be employed, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression
and Time Series Analysis. This study will also control for variables like foreign domestic
investment, official development assistance and official aid, and total debt service. The inclusion
criteria in selecting these variables are due to previous studies have included them, however,
arriving to different conclusions. These studies will be briefly mentioned in chapter 6.
The research questions are the following: first, do regime dynamics affect economic growth in
sub-Saharan Africa? Second, do different levels of democracy and autocracy influence economic
growth in sub-Saharan Africa? The empirical findings in this study suggest that regime dynamics
do affect economic growth when controlling countries that are oil producers.'̀  Moreover,
countries that have maintained their status as a democracy over time tend to have higher levels of
economic growth compared to countries that have democratic interruptions or the ones that are
not democratic.
A considerable number of empirical researches have examined regime type and economic
growth in different ways. This study will focus deeply on comparative performance of more
democratic, less democratic regime types, new or mature democracies, and new or mature
2 Oil producers are represented by Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Mauritania,











autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa. Many empirical studies contain methodological problems
when taking into consideration only developed countries or by doing Time Series Analysis
including countries from different regions without paying attention to regional particularities.
Furthermore, many studies focus on how democracy affects micro and macroeconomic
performances. In this regard, they analyze whether democracies are more or less effective than
non-democracies in carrying out policies that stimulate economic growth. This study differs from
the previous research since it centered on the aspect that regime stability is an important
condition affecting economic growth. Countries with maintenance of regime, being it a
democracy or an autocracy, are expected to have higher growth rates compared to countries that
have democratic or autocratic interruptions. Therefore, regime stability over time is a key











2. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
The beginning of the third wave of democratization, despite the differences of cultural and
historical contexts, gave us a sensation of democratic success. The democratic phenomenon also
led scholars to mention that it represented the end of the history and the triumph of the
democratic model with the fall of the Berlin wall. 3 Even though, Samuel Huntington stated that
the waves of democratization could be followed by reverse ones. 4 In fact, at the current time it is
more predominant to find the structure of democracy in authoritarian regimes, such as the hybrid
regimes. As a result, democracy has triumphed, although, it does not show a singular fashion.
For instance, there are many democratizing, authoritarian and hybrid regimes in sub-Saharan
Africa. The differences accounting for different levels of democracies and authoritarian regimes
might be due to their levels of institutionalization, legacy of past-regimes, and historical and
cultural contexts. 5
In the literature on the subject of regime type and economic growth there are a variety of
quantitative and qualitative studies leading to different interpretations of this relationship.
Scholars have focused on four main aspects. First, modernization theory states that economic
growth is a necessary requisite for democracy. 6 A second group of scholars argue that economic
growth is not a condition for democracy, even poor countries can democratize.' Third, the
literature on democracy states that once democracy is established, the continuous economic
development helps to maintain democracy. 8 Fourth, the emergent literature on the consequences
of democracy (COD) states that democracy promotes economic growth. 9
3
Francis Fukuyama, The End of the History and the Last Man (NY: Maxwell Macmillan, 1992).
4
Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics 17/3 (April 1965), 386-430.
5
Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Political Transitions in
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
`'Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy."
American Political Science Review 53 (1959), 69-105.
7
Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegel, and Michael M. Weistain, The Democratic Advantage: How Democracies
Promote Prosperity and Peace ( New York: Routledge, 2005).
8Przeworski et al., op. cit.











2.1 The Modernization Theory
Since the 1960s, most of the literature on the subject of democracy has tended to analyze it as
either a cause or a consequence of economic development. In this regard, modernization theory
has emphasized that authoritarian regimes are better able to create the conditions for economic
growth that would lead to democracy. Scholars with this view focus their attention on economic
growth as a precondition for democracy. Many studies have focused on the relationship between
democracy and economic growth since the time when the famous foundational article of the
modernization theory, written by Seymour Martin Lipset about the social requisites of
democracy, came out. 10 As a result, scholars have been centering the debate on whether or not
economic growth must precede democracy.
Lipset provides the first empirical work using cross national analysis, correlating data related to
economic growth and democracy." He argues that economic development is positively
correlated with democracy. He focuses on the structural transformations in a society. According
to his view, rapid economic growth engenders a set of structural changes, such as
industrialization, urbanization, and education.'`' The better educated people are, the more easily
they are mobilized to participate in politics as a way to influence the political system in order to
have their aspirations satisfied. Urbanization and education also contribute to the formation of
political parties and the emergence of the middle classes. Meanwhile, growth under authoritarian
regimes is possible since governments are insulated from the demands of the citizens." On the
other hand, democratic governments in poor countries need to respond to several demands
coming from many sectors of the society, such as schools, the health care system, clean running
water, and so on. Therefore, authoritarian regimes can maintain stability since they are insulated
from society. They can also carry out policies that force citizens to be disconnected from politics
since non-democratic regimes might use repression against opponents and enemies. Scholars
' °Lipset, op. cit.
'Ibid.
13Theda Skocpol, Bringing the state back in: Strategies of analysis in current research. In Peter Evans, Dietrich












sustain this view by saying that non-democratic states are better at restricting credit, controlling
wages, public spending, attracting foreign investment, and implementing effective policies
regarding development and trade. 14 These factors are very important in producing higher
economic growth.
Lipset's main hypothesis is that it is the economic development that occurs under authoritarian
regimes which is the main feature leading to democracy. 15 Economic growth and the social
transformations associated with it generate more social stability during the transition process
compared to countries facing economic recession. The flourishing of democracy in a growing
economy is seen by many academics as the result of the process of socio-economic
transformations, especially the increase of mass participation. Modernization theory assumes that
authoritarian regimes invest in industrialization and human capital at the time when they are
growing quickly. According to them, the issue of time order infers that economic development
leads to democracy. Indeed, the zone of change arrives when critical citizens strongly demand
and pressure for political change through popular participation, regime openness, freedom and
rights.
Yet Africa's authoritarian regimes have not been promoting industrialization by investing in
human capital but, instead, their growth rates are mainly based on the exploitation of strategic
natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and gold. In most of the cases where non-democratic
regimes are growing, their revenues are used to sustain neo-patrimonial networks and to acquire
personal wealth and status for political elites. In addition, most of the studies of structural and
historical changes have looked at European cases. Long periods of economic growth generated
the accumulation of wealth in Western European societies. As a result, political values and
beliefs have changed over generations. The most important factor associated with wealth is
education. Education is linked to a new set of values that people learn at school as part of their
early socialization. Education also increases their capacity to make rational choices. Moreover,
the higher the levels of people's education, the more likely they are to believe in democratic
14 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the periphery: The politics of growth in the newly industrializing countries.












values and support democratic practices.16  Huntington points out that as a country develops
economically, they can be conceived of as moving into a zone of transition or choice, in which
traditional forms of rule become increasingly difficult to maintain and new types of political
institutions are required to aggregate the demands of an increasingly complex society and
implement public policies in such a society. 17
Another interesting point to take into consideration is that cross-sectional studies tend to confirm
the modernization theory, while regional studies in Latin America and Africa, using Time Series
Analysis, do not present the same results. Consequently, large n cross sectional observations can
lead to biased outcomes. As a result, modernization theory might explain the trends in the so-
called developed world, but they do not elucidate the cases represented by developing countries,
except for China. Moreover, many scholars have centered their quantitative and qualitative
analysis comparing countries that are located in different regions and have different legacies and
cultures. In this case, their results might be biased since they include in the same basket Western
and non-Western countries. For instance, democracy in the United States is categorized as the
same as in Ghana, since the majority of these studies tend to classify democracy and autocracy in
a dichotomous fashion.
2.2 Wealth and Sustainable Democracy
Modernization theory has been criticized by scholars such as Przeworski et al. who argue that
modernization theorists have failed to differentiate between the establishment of democracy and
its consolidation.18 Przeworski et al. criticize modernization theory; however, in their analysis
about economic growth and democracy around the world between 1940 and 1990, they observe
that most of the democracies that have maintained their status are considered rich. 19
Consequently, they claim that the consolidation of democracies is much likely to occur in
affluent or wealth countries. Lipset argues that economic development leads to democracy,
16 Lipset, op. cit.














however, the data in his article shows additional evidence that economic development is more
i mportant in fostering democratic sustainability than generating democratic transitions. 20° Adam
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that the emergence of democracy is independent of the
level of development.'` 1 In this line of argument, Lipset points out that there is a strong and
positive correlation between national wealth and democracy. 22 Lipset explains this relationship
by saying that democracy may be more likely to emerge as countries develop economically. 23
Lipset refers to this as "the more well-to-do a nation is, the greater the chances that it will sustain
democracy."24 Lipset looks at countries in Latin America and Europe and the English-speaking
countries since First World War. 25 Therefore, European and the English speaking countries
present a higher level of wealth and they are democracies. His findings demonstrate that most
countries that are not considered democratic are also economically underdeveloped, on the other
hand, modern democracies are, in most of cases, considered developed.
According to Lipset, only in a society where there is well-being can intelligent participation in
political subjects occur. He points out that "the mass of the population could intelligently
participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the
appeals of irresponsible demagogues. The society divided between the large impoverished mass
and small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (...) or in tyranny". 26 A significant
finding comes from Adam Przeworski et al., who point out that there is no relationship between
levels of economic growth and transition to democracy. 27 However, they argue that poor
democracies are more vulnerable and might collapse and the rich ones never break down.
Przeworski et al. find that the less successful democratic regimes in generating economic growth
are more likely to break down compared to the ones that are succeeding economically. 28 An
i mportant finding in their study is that economic growth is more related to democratic stability
20 Lipset, op. cit.
21
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49 (January 1997),
155-183.




26 Lipset, op. cit., p75.












than the causation of democratization. Przeworski et al.'s argument is that democracies, having
been established for whatever reason, are more likely to survive in wealthy countries. 29 They
point out that democracy is likely to emerge in a country that is or is not developing
economically, but democracy is more likely to survive in an economically developed country. 3°
Przeworski et al.'s empirical study finds out that dictatorships survive in countries with a per
capita income under $1,000. 31 They are less stable in countries with per capita incomes between
$1,001 and $4,000, and even less so between $4,001 and $7,000. 32 Nevertheless, if income
reaches the level of $7,000, the situation reverses and they become more likely to survive. Many
cases in the Middle East support this explanation since countries with non-democratic regimes,
such as Qatar, Kuwait, Brunei, and Bahrain, have their Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter
referred to as GDP) per capita higher than $35,000. 33 They are considered stable autocracies or
sultanistic regimes according to Linz and Stepan. 34 As a result, transitions to democracy are less
likely in poor countries than in rich ones, but they are more likely at the intermediate income
levels. However, China, in this analysis, would be considered an outlier because it should have
an unstable authoritarian regime since its GDP per capita is $6.000. 35 Looking at African cases,
two other outliers emerge: Angola and Equatorial Guinea. These two countries are considered
unstable authoritarian regimes with high levels of GDP per capita.
On the other hand, a per capita income does have a strong impact on the survival of
democracies. 36 No democracy has ever been subverted in a country with a per capita income
higher than that of Argentina line in 1975: $6,055. 37 The probability of collapsing in an affluent




Przeworski et al., op. cit., 2000.
32
 Przeworski et al., op. cit.
33 CIA, The World Factbook, Publications CIA (2009). Available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/rankorderguide.html  (November, 2007).
34 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1996).
35 Ibid.
36 Prezerowski et al., op. cit.











$6,055 is because an increasingly sophisticated population will inevitably emerge and call for
greater political participation, freedom and social policies than that provided by the government.
For instance, African countries with the highest long-term growth rates have been Botswana and
Mauritius, both also have the longest period of being democratic. South Africa, Botswana, and
Mauritius have GDP per capita higher than the Argentina line. 38 More recently, Benin, Ghana,
Mozambique, and South Africa have economic growth with the resurgence of democracy.
Continuing with African examples, growth is also positive in Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and
Malawi, where democratic transitions occurred in the early 1990s. On the other hand, Kenya,
Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo represented the worse economic results in Africa
during the 1990s. All of them were led by an authoritarian leader. Consequently, what leads to
democracy is still an open question, however, the majority of the scholars agree that democracy,
having been established for whatever reason, might be more likely to survive in developed
countries.
Przeworski et al. point out that for controlling wealth, countries with continuous rates of
economic growth have a probability of democratic death that is 1 in 135 during any three or
more consecutive years, and 1 in 13 when there is an economic decline during any two
consecutive years. 39 Therefore, countries that are growing have more chances to sustain their
democratic regimes even if they have low income levels. On the other hand, according to
Przeworski et al. most democratic deaths happen when a country experiences an economic crisis,
this is true for countries with low levels of wealth.40° For instance, the current economic crisis is
strongly impacting the Spanish economy. Nevertheless, democracy is maintained even with the
decline in support for the Socialist Party. On the other hand, looking at developing countries, in
particular looking at the African scenario, a strong economic recession could make democratic
regimes fall due to the lack of economic revenues necessary to maintain social programs, the
lack of economic diversification, and the still recent experience with democracy. Therefore, one
of the reasons why their democratic system might regress is because their governments, with a
reduced budget, cannot satisfy popular demands. As a consequence, economic crisis represents
38 CIA, op. cit.












the most common threat to democratic stability in democratizing countries, especially for low
income ones.
2.3 Democracy and Economic Growth
According to Mancur Olson, one of the reasons to support democracies has to do with the fact
that democracy is good for economy, promoting economic efficiency since investments tend to
be relocated into more productive activities and consequently there is a scenario of more
predictability and confidence in the market system:" Olson arguments that democracies tend to
provide more incentives to economic growth than do autocracies. These incentives are related to
the protection of individual rights to private property ownership. 42 In contrast, autocratic regimes
usually do not enforce these laws. Therefore, foreign capital tends to go to more stable countries
that are, in most of the cases represented by democratic countries rather than autocratic ones.
Autocracies tend to safeguard the political and economic interests of the authoritarian leaders
and their supporters, despite those of the society.
One of the problems regarding economic growth theory is that many dependent and independent
variables can be described in the relationship with economic growth. Many variables are proved
to have a correlation with growth, however, the causality effect has never been proved.
Moreover, many spurious or third variables were also correlated with growth. One example of
that is manifested in the work of Eberhard Scholing and Vincenz Timmermann. 43 They include
118 independent variables correlating with growth in their study. They conclude that almost all
the socio-economic variables included in the model show significant direct and/or indirect
growth effects. Therefore, they demonstrate in their study that most of these variables are
statistically significant and partially correlated with growth.




Eberhard Scholling and Vincenz Timmermann, "Why LDC Growth Rates Differ: Measuring "Unmeasurable"











The economic growth theory has been influenced by the work of Robert Solow, the neo-classical
model of economic growth refers that the exogenous technological changes introduced in a
country leads to economic growth. 44 Many scholars have criticized Solow's model due to its
deterministic view since countries with the same level of technology would have the same rate of
growth. The next existing empirical literature on economic growth has developed an endogenous
economic growth model. Economic growth theory, based on the endogenous economic growth,
which includes government policies that lead to economic growth, such as operation of financial
markets, trade policy, and government expenditure, and taxation. Sergio Rebelo develops a
model which includes a production function based on a combination of physical and human
capital. 45 Larry Jones and Rodolfo Manuelli discuss the endogenous' model of growth and find
that policies which redistribute income to the young, such as public education, may increase
growth.46 Therefore, their findings suggest that the policies carried out by the governments
regarding the promotion of education and human capital can have impacts in the long run
economic growth. Easterly and Wetzel also argue that some countries with similar level of
investment might generate wide variation in growth rates. 47 Therefore, they emphasize that it is
important to understand the factors affecting the efficiency of investment.48
Robert J. Barro points out that, regardless of regime type, the less corrupt the elites are the more
likely to advance economic growth. 49 However, looking at the historical evidence on Africa's
economic growth since the 1960 authoritarian regimes have failed to improve economic
performance.50° The economic stagnation and weakness in sub-Saharan Africa were due to
decades of mismanagement, corruption, and a growing debt crisis together with neo-patrimonial
policies under authoritarian regimes. 51
``Robert Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth" Quarterly Journal of' Economics 70 (February
1956).
45Sergio Rebelo, "Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run Growth" Journal of Political Economy (1987).
46Larry Jones and Rodolfo Manuelli, "Finite Horizons and Growth." Northwestern University (1990).
47 William R. Easterly and Deborah L. Wetzel, "Policy Determinants of Growth: Survey of Theory and Evidence"
The World Bank PPR WPY343 (1989).
48
Easterly and Wetzel, op. cit.
49 Robert J. Barro, Determinants of' economic growth. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).
50 Young, C. (1998). Africa: An interim balance sheet. In P. Lewis (Ed.), Africa: Dilemmas of development and
change. Boulder: Westview Press.











According to Martin's empirical findings that were taken into consideration the period between
1967 and 1987, "countries in the sub-Saharan African region that have enhanced the openness of
their trade regimes have, on average, tended to perform better in their economic growth than
those that have not." 52 The author expects that economic liberalization policies and privatization
will generate a higher level of growth in Africa. However, the process of economic openness in
sub-Saharan Africa have focused mainly on rapid liberalization and free market policies,
especially through the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), in a continent that its economy is
based on the primary sector and very specialized `monocrop' for export. Another problem related
to that is the United States and the European Union's agricultural subsidies that arrive to a total
of $ 1 billion per day and subsequently, part of these subsidized agricultural products are
entering in African countries through food aid. Therefore, subsidies in agriculture have a
transnational impact affecting the food security of many lives across the African continent.
Robert J. Barro points out that in the case of countries with low levels of democracy the
increment of political freedom results in an enhancement of growth. 53 Therefore, good
governance could stimulate economic growth. His study took into consideration 100 countries
from 1960 and 1990, concluding that middle levels of democracy have more chances to grow,
the lowest levels come second, and the highest levels come third. 54
Following this view, Carles Boix and Susan Stokes also argue that economic growth is important
in sustaining democracy and contributing to democratic transition. 55 They mention that in the last
decades, countries that have achieved a per capita income of $12.000, had more chances to
democratize than countries with lower per capita incomes. Their study also concludes that
economic development had more impact on democratic transition during the end of the World
War II than it has had in the last decades.
52 Kazi M.Matin, Openness and economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from time-series
cross-country analysis ( World Bank Working Papers 1025( 1992) p24.
53Robert J. Barro, "Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth 1 (March, 1996) 1-27.
54Ibid., p14.











2.4 The Promotion of Prosperity by Democracies
Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegel, and Michael M. Weinstein argue that poor countries can
democratize and these poor democracies can also develop quite effectively. 56 They say that there
is no indication that democracies are less capable of generating growth compared to authoritarian
regimes.57 Halperin et al. argue that looking at "the experience of developing countries as a
whole, those with more representative and pluralistic political systems have typically developed
significantly more rapidly, broadly, and consistently than those with closed systems." 58 The main
reason stated by Halperin et al. why developing democracies generate more economic
development has to do with three characteristics: shared power, openness, and adaptability. 59
Shared power means that government's power is limited due to the separation of power. The
authors argue that democracies, at every income level, that have established stronger
mechanisms of checks and balances are growing more rapidly than those that have not.
Democratic governments receive pressure from different interest groups and must consider
different demands and make policy decisions that improve society's quality of life.
In addition, democracy also promotes efficiency since investments tend to be directed into more
productive activities and there is more confidence in the market system. Moreover, ineffectual
and corrupt leaders can always be replaced in the democratic system. Openness also generates
transparency, confidence for investors, and enhances leaders' responsiveness. In this regard, the
authors argue that any analysis regarding economic growth should not be restricted to elections,
but should include institutions since countries that hold elections might have weak institutions
and present a lower economic growth compared to democracies with strong political institutions.
Openness also generates transparency, confidence for investors, and enhances leaders'
responsiveness. In this regard, it is very important to analyze democratic institutions beyond the
country's electoral system in order to examine how strong these institutions are. Therefore,
Halperin et al. argue that any analysis regarding economic growth should not be restricted to
56














elections, but should include institutions since countries that hold elections might have weak
institutions and present a lower economic growth compared to democracies with strong
institutions. 60
2.5 Consequences of Democracy
Consequences of democracy are a new subfield in the literature of democracy. 61 Consequences
of democracy focus on the effect of democracy on external factors that are not democracy in
itself, but, instead it refers to the democratic outcomes. For instance, democracy affects
economic development, facilitate economic reform, increase social welfare, and promote
domestic peace and order. Scholars concerned with the issue of possible causes of
democratization tend to look at operational definitions and measure democracy as a way to
determine a country's regime type. However, scholars that study the consequences of democracy
are more concerned with issues of definition and measurement relating to the dependent variable
they are working on (economic growth, nation building, and so on). 62 For this reason, their
research includes empirical indicators such as education spending, infant mortality, GDP per
capita, among other variables. Indeed, the first concern is still with the definition of democracy,
and essential differentiation that must be made is regarding what democracy is from what
democracy generates.
2.6 The African Case
The cases in Africa and the Middle East demonstrate that wealth not only makes the stability of
the democratic system possible, but also the stability of the authoritarian one. What makes
democracy preferred is that it excels in its economic, social and political performances.
Moreover, African cases do not support modernization argument since transitions to democracy
have happened in a context of economic stagnation and decline. South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho,













San Tome and Principe, and Madagascar had their first free and fair elections at the beginning of
the 1990s, before that they were performing badly economically. Indeed, most of them have
grown during their first years of being democracies. Therefore, most of the countries that have
embraced democratic transitions after 1989 were previously immersed in economic downturns
and positive economic growth took place following regime changes in many parts of the sub-
Saharan Africa. Above all, modernization theory cannot explain the flourishing of
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. The argument that says that economic growth leads to
democracy is simplifying the reality, especially in the case of Africa's experience with
democracy. Thus, the modernization theory has been attacked for its deterministic and
teleological view of the world, since it assumes that democracy will necessarily be achieved if a
country reaches a high level of economic growth. 63
On the other hand, Bratton and van de Walle point out that for political legitimacy in sub-
Saharan Africa, democracies do not rely on economic performance as do authoritarian regimes. 64
Moreover, Bratton and van de Walle argue that the emergence of democracy in Africa after 1989
was not explained by the modernization theory, but, instead by pre-existing regime types.
Bratton and van de Walle point out that:
"Democratic governments rarely rely for legitimacy on economic performance to the same extent as authoritarian
governments do, but they too must improve material conditions on their watch. In a consolidated democracy,
economic grievances are expressed through the ballot box and can lead to the replacement of one elected
government by another; in a nonconsolidated democracy, however, the penalty for poor performance may well be
the end of democratic rule itself and a return to authoritarianism." 65
According to Bratton and van de Walle, thirty sub-Saharan countries have done some sort of
political liberalization in the early 1990s, however, most of them have not experienced their
transition into democracy. 66 The study of previous regime types was important in order to define
their specific characteristics that have contributed, in different ways, to the process of political
openness or liberalization and democratization. The table below shows that just 16 countries had
63 Przeworski et al., op. cit., 2000, p97.
64 Bratton and van de Walle, op. cit.
65 Ibid., p239.
66Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Political Transitions in











begun their democratic transition until 1994. Nevertheless, many countries that had begun their
democratization process during the 1990s have had periods of interruption or failed to conclude
it."
Transition outcomes:
Two countries had a precluded transition, meaning that the transition has not gone further. Civil
wars have made the environment so insecure that leaders were more worried about the conflict
than the political changes. 69 Twelve countries had their transition blocked when incumbent elites
avoided elections.70° Other twelve countries had a flawed transition, in which incumbents
accepted elections, but they manipulated their procedures or results. 71 Regarding the democratic
transition, sixteen countries have begun this process, meaning that they have experienced free
and fair elections. 72 As a consequence, transition phase had different outcomes, such as
authoritarian, democratic, and mixed regimes.
Scholars that focused their analysis on cross-national research design, including many countries
from different regions, might have lost some validity in the sense that regarding African cases,
regime types and economic growth might not follow the same pattern compared to other regions.
Sub-Saharan African countries have a common legacy of colonization and the unsuccessful
establishment of democracy in the 1960s, except for Botswana, the Gambia, and Mauritius. Most
67Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Niger, Seychelles, and
Zambia (Source: Freedom House).
"Bratton and van de Walle, op. Cit., p117.
69Precluded transitions: Liberia and Sudan (n=2)
''Blocked transitions: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) (n=12)
71Flawed transition: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Mauritania, Swaziland, and Togo (n=12)
''Democratic transition: Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,











of the African countries have also introduced a Presidential system in which leaders tended to
centralize the power of the state and control this power in their own hands. As a legacy of
colonialism, neo-patrimonial policies were strengthened. Therefore, autocracies managed to
sustain their regimes through patron-client networks. In many African countries, patrimonialism
strategies were established as a tool to benefit specific groups, especially when an ethnic group
was considered the same as the political elites. In this case, ethnicity was manipulated by leaders
in order to receive enough support to protect their political and economic power. In this context,
Africa's rich natural resources were used to promote divisions among ethnic groups that have for
centuries been living together in harmony. The emergence of civil wars in many sub-Saharan
African countries has been propitiated by unequal access to resources and political
opportunities. 73 Indeed, the politicization of ethnicity increased the evidence of social, political,
and economic differences among ethnic groups.
In addition, many years of dictatorship rule across sub-Saharan Africa puts in evidence the
increment of poverty levels and the lack of measures to control the increment of the HIV/AIDS
cases, which has become a pandemic and strongly related to human security. Agricultural
modernization has also failed in many African countries, mainly because politicians did not
promote investments in infrastructures and agricultural mechanization. Moreover, political rights
and civil liberties are still aspirations for Africans. These issues demonstrate some of the unique
aspects of African social and political institutions.
The analysis of this study will principally address the proposition that the maintenance and
stability of democracy are the main determinants of economic growth. Since sub-Saharan Africa
is still a democratizing continent, measurement of democracy that captures its levels of freedom
and political rights might be more accurate. This research will focus on the following statement:
early maintaining democracy increases economic growth. Therefore, regime dynamics do
account for different rates of growth in Africa and democracy also does a better job in generating
growth compared to authoritarian regimes. The relevance of the study of democracy and
73 Judith Vorrath and Lutz Krebs, "Democratization and Conflict in ethnically Divided Societies," Living Reviews in












economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is due to the fact that much of the research has not
approached sub-Saharan countries through a single region study. Halperin et al. focus their
analysis on whether democracy usually generates more rapid and consistent improvements in the
well being of the society than do authoritarian regimes. 74 They argue that democracy, being
established in a low income country, has superior developmental performance when compared to
non-democracies. 75 They look at socio-economic factors that are important to sustaining
democracy. This analysis does not centre its attention on social improvements, but it does look at
economic aspects that are the outcomes of a stable democracy. In this case, democracy leads to
economic growth.
Furthermore, sub-Saharan countries are an interesting focus of analysis since many countries are
still doing their transition to democracy and there are a predominance of non-democratic regimes
and an emergence of the so-called hybrid regimes. Recently, there is the emergence of a
considerable interest in understanding the spread of hybrid regimes in Africa. Hybrid regimes are
represented by partial types of democracy and autocracy that are consolidating as semi-
democracies and autocracies. Many scholars are investigating this phenomenon, such as
Diamond and Schedler, since many countries in Africa are not moving forward towards
democracy, but, instead they are consolidating without being fully democratic. In this case,
different indices of democracy that are based on different indicators help scholars to measure
regime type. For instance, Freedom House defines partially free countries that are close to the
notion of hybrid regimes. On the other side, the overall stagnation and economic decline
compared to other regions of the world. Hybrid regimes might be consolidating instead of
improving and becoming more democratic, the study of regime types and economic growth must
be sensitive enough to include these categories in its' analysis, since different levels of
democracy and autocracy might have different influences on economic growth in sub-Saharan
Africa.












3. CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
In order to differentiate democracy from authoritarian regime it is important establish the
meaning of democracy. According to Larry Diamond "we are still far from consensus on what
constitutes democracy."76 As a result, there are many definitions about its content. Moreover, the
third wave of democratization has also intensified the lack of agreement considering the
definition of democracy since most of the newly established democratic states have not made
important improvements beyond their electoral systems. 77 In many of these new democracies,
rule of law and civil rights are mentioned in their constitutions, however, they are not enforced
and accomplished by their governments. An interesting pattern is that African rulers or the
powerful men do not avoid democracy, but, instead they use the democratic machine to
legitimate their governments meanwhile they enlarge their personal power at the expense of
institutions that should exercise checks on them. 78 In this regard, the common denominator of
democratic governments is that leaders hold elections. Nevertheless, elections are an ingredient
of democracy, but it does not constitute democracy in itself, since some countries celebrate
regular elections meanwhile establishing an autocratic government. 79 For instance, in many
African countries, authoritarian regimes are behind the electoral façades using democratic
procedures but having authoritarian practices. Mikael Wigell argues that many cases of transition
from authoritarian regime to democracy confirm that it does not necessarily follow a linear
fashion towards liberal democracy or back into autocracy." Many countries in Africa illustrate
this argument since they tend to be consolidating as hybrid regimes instead of moving to
democratic regimes.
76Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002) 21-35, p21.
77Ibid.
78Richard Joseph, "Challenges of a "Frontier" Region," Journal of Democracy 19/2 (April 2008) 94-108.
79Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: the Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Bonder, Colo.: Rienner
Publishers (2006).
80Mikael Wigell, "Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes': Regime Types and Concepts in comparative Politics,"











As a consequence, many authors tend to conceptualize these undemocratic regimes using
different terms, such as illiberal democracies, hybrid regimes, and pseudo-democracies. 8 1
Looking into this aspect, there are "varieties of democracy" and it seems that some of them are
improving in a gradualist manner. 82 Participation through free and fair elections leads to a
process of rule of law with the constraints on government's power. According to the Freedom
House, different degrees of civil liberties and political rights account principally for the 'varieties
of democracy. ' 83
Going further, the primarily requisite and the necessary requisite for democracy is the electoral
system, especially in new democratizing societies, elections contribute and they are an essential
ingredient to democratization. In these new democracies, elections might account for much more
than a procedural mechanism. According to Staffan Lindberg, election generates a broader
impact on democracy than is currently taken into consideration." For him, the establishment of
multi-party elections engenders liberalization and the repetitiveness of electoral activities leads
to the transformation and improvement in the democratic system. 85 Lindberg also points out that
when a government breaks down, it usually happens just after the first election and after
celebrating continuous second and third elections, regimes are more likely to survive." His
conclusion is that a sequence of elections contributes to the democratization process, and more
specifically it forges civil liberties and political rights in a country. Therefore, a free and fair
election is the precondition and an indispensable requisite for democracy. When a system fails, it
is the electoral system that falls first, in some cases election is there but only on the surface. 87
81Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76/6 (November-December 1997) 22-24.
Diamond, op. cit.
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What makes for Democracy?" in Politics
in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour
Martin Lipset. Boulder, Colynne Rienner (1995) 1-66.
83 Freedom House. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 (November 2009).















Election is the primarily institution that connects citizens to the government, especially given
them in Africa that party systems are very weak and lacks the institutionalization and the same
happens with the civil society. Thus, election constitutes the basically indispensable function of
democracy. In this regard, electoral system is the primary institution that accounts for the process
of democratization and democratic consolidation in Africa. As Michael Bratton and Daniel
Posner argue "while you can have elections without democracy, you cannot have democracy
without elections."88 Indeed, it is in the electoral arena that the party system gets
institutionalized.
Until the third wave of democratization, authors have analyzed democracy taking mainly into
consideration European and English speaking countries. As a consequence, many scholars have
applied a minimalist conceptualization of democracy that was useful to classify these Western
countries. Huntington argues that an institutional definition of democracy provides a better
analytical and empirical accuracy. His conceptualization is based on a procedural definition of
democracy. 89 For Huntington, "democracy has a useful meaning only when it is defined in
institutional terms."90° Institutional definition of democracy means the selection of leaders
through competitive elections. On the other hand, according to Larry Diamond, authors that use a
minimalist definition of democracy may commit the fallacy of electoralism, putting too much
emphasis on elections over other dimensions of democracy. 91 For Diamond, civil liberties, that
are related to an independent media, freedom of belief, speech, rights of expression,
organization, and assembly, are the major components of democracy. 92 The reason why he said
that is because civil liberties varies in places that hold free and fair elections in a multiparty
basis, especially with the emergence of democracies that do not follow Western pattern.
"Michael Bratton and Daniel N. Posner, "A First Look at Second Elections in Africa, with illustrations from
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Therefore, a step further from institutional democracy must be taken in order to avoid the
"fallacy of electoralism." Civil liberties and political rights must be included beyond the
procedural definition of democracy in order to take into consideration the cases that fall in the
borderline or grey zone. Robert Dahl's conceptualization of democracy includes two dimensions:
political contestation and political participation, including civil liberties. 93 Civil liberties are an
important attribute to consider because it permits going beyond the electoral system. It also
opens the possibility to create a model taking into consideration Dahl's two dimensions that it is
possible to distinguish among different levels of democracy and autocracy instead of defining
democracy and non-democracy in a dichotomous fashion, leading to a model in which one size
fits all. Dahl's definition of democracy is based on two political dimensions, one is formed by
public contestation and the second dimension is represented by participation. 94 The two
dimensions exist in an environment of civil liberties. 95 This definition is important because it
captures the main elements of democracy at the same time that it preserves the parsimony of the
concept. It takes into consideration the formal institutionalization of the rule of law, represented
by the celebration of free and fair elections including a set of freedoms that permit citizens to
exercise their control over decision makers. For instance, Dahl's dimension of participation is
important in order to analyze one party system in South Africa and Botswana. Furthermore,
Dahl's definition of democracy is important since it permits to do an empirical measurement.
Above all, economic growth must be analyzed over time in order to see its sustainability,
stagnation, and economic decay. Different types of democratic and authoritarian regimes tend to
generate different types of economic growth. The idea regarding regime types and economic
growth is that economic growth in democratic systems is more stable. As Halperin et al. mention
investments and market confident is generated by an environment of transparency and political
and economic stability. 96 Therefore, it takes time for a democracy to be considered stable, thus,
its economic development is also happening in a late stage. For example, South Africa is
considered democratic since 1994, however, its economic growth started in 2003.
93 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale, 1971).
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.











4. MEASURING REGIME DYNAMICS AND LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY
As it was stated before, the levels of democracy and autocracy will be empirical classified
according to the Freedom House Index. I constructed an aggregate Freedom House Index by
summing up the components of civil liberties and political rights and then dividing by two.
Freedom House Index has a scale ranging between 1 and 7 (where 1 represents the more
democratic and 7 the more authoritarian countries) on two dimensions: political rights and civil
liberties. Moreover, I reversed the Freedom House scale in order to facilitate the measurement of
the levels of democracy. As a result, the more authoritarian countries are ranked 1 and the more
democratic is equal 7. This measurement of levels of democracy is very important especially
with the emergence of the grey zone or hybrid regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore,
dichotomous classification of democracy and autocracy is viewed as ideal types. On the other
hand, ordinal measures are important to capture democratic levels. Nevertheless, the categorical
classifications from Freedom House, such as not free, partial free and free, are also important in
order to categorize countries according to their regime dynamics and levels of democracy.
Regime dynamics' categories were created in order to consider how the process of
democratization and democratic interruption affect economic growth.
According to Freedom House, political rights "enable people to participate freely in the political
process, including through the right to vote and stand for public office, and elected
representatives who have a decisive impact on policies and are accountable to the electorate.
Civil liberties allow for the freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference coming from the state."' This
way of measuring democracy takes into consideration the levels of democracy and autocracy.
Political rights include free and fair competition for political office, the right to vote, the
presence of multiple political parties, and decentralized political power. 98 The civil liberties
dimension refers to freedoms of speech and assembly, free press, and open public discussion. 99













Economic growth is measured as a change in the gross domestic product per capita. Economic
growth is defined as the increase in the aggregate level of income in a given period of time,
usually a year. It is measured by growth rate that is the percentage of change in output from last
year. The data regarding growth rates for GDP expressed in billions of 2005 dollars between
1988 and 2008 are found at the US Department of Agriculture webpage. 100
In the study of regime dynamics and economic growth some aspects regarding timing and regime
stability are important to consider, since countries that are maintaining their regime status being
it democracy or authoritarian regimes should be growing more than the ones that have unstable
regimes or have moments of regime interruption.
The main reason why using regime dynamics' classification is that democratic interruption might
have a different score in its levels of economic growth compared to countries that have
maintained their authoritarian regimes. Maintaining authoritarian regime might have higher
levels of economic growth since they have consolidated their regime and have a stable political
system, even if they are not democratic. This might be the case of China or in the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, oil rich countries may be sustaining their autocracies despite ethnic conflicts and
the dispute over natural resources and control by the militias as the case of Nigeria in the Niger
Delta. For instance, this classification also explains interesting cases, such as the Equatorial
Guinea. This country is an autocracy that has been maintaining its system since its colonial
independence and it also has high levels of economic growth. It might be due to the maintenance
of non-democratic regime on the long term, sustained by its oil revenues that is the base of the
Equatorial Guinea's economy.
As stated before, the impact of regime dynamics and levels of democracy on economic growth
will be tested on 47 sub-Saharan African countries over the period of 20 years, between 1988
and 2008. The research questions are the following:
1 — Do regime dynamics affect economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa?
1(X) United States Department of Agriculture. Available at:











2 — Do different levels of democracy and autocracy lead to different levels of economic growth
in sub-Saharan Africa?
In order to answer the above questions, the following hypothesis will be tested:
• In the case of autocracies, countries are more prone to have economic vulnerability and
strong fluctuations over time;
• The level of democracy affects growth;
• Economic growth is a matter of time, as a result, early democracies have high levels of
growth compared to late democracies (late process of democratization);
• Democracies are better at sustaining growth over long periods of time than are
authoritarian regimes.
5. REGIME DYNAMICS
The tables 1 and 2 represent the number of countries according to the classifications of regime
dynamics and there is a list of countries ranking according to the following categorizations:
maintaining autocracy (main_auto), liberalizing autocracy (libe_auto), early maintaining
democracy (ear main), late maintaining democracies (lat main), early interruption democracy
(ear_inte), and late interruption democracy (lat_inte). The list represents 47 sub-Saharan
countries with the exception of Somalia due to the lack of accurate data. The table 3 includes the


















lib e aut o 9
Total 47 
Table 2: List of Countries Ranked according to the Regime Dynamics
Regime dynamics Countries
main_auto (autocracy maintaining) Angola, Chad, Congo Kinshasa, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Burkina
Faso, Ivory Coast
libe_auto (liberalizing autocracy) Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Ethiopia, the Gambia,
Mauritania, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
Djibouti
ear main (early maintaining democracy) Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa
earinte (early democracy interruption) Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville,
Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Niger
San Tome and Principe, Comoros
lat_main (late maintaining democracy) Burundi, Senegal
lat 
—











Table 3: Average of Economic Growth by Regime Dynamics and sub-Saharan Countries



















6. REGIME DYNAMICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The empirical research findings and its analysis are illustrated in this chapter. The quantitative
analysis centered on the overall economic performance regarding the six categories developed in
this study. The categories are associated with democracy and autocracy since they are the
dominant typologies in the current political science literature. However, the empirical analysis
will be sensitive on considering different levels of democratic and autocratic regimes based on
regime change, stability and maturity. This classification is called regime dynamics, aiming to be
sensitive on how long a country has been democratic or autocratic and whether it has had a
regime change.
This research investigates the economic performance of democratic and non-democratic regimes
in 47 sub-Saharan African countries in the period from 1988 to 2008. Two quantitative
techniques will be employed, Ordinary Least Square regression and Time Series Analysis. This
study will also control for variables such as foreign domestic investment, official development
assistance and official aid, and total debt service. The data regarding those variables were
gathered from the World Bank - World Development Indicators. 101 The growth rates data for
GDP (in billions of 2005 dollars) between 1988 and 2008 are found on the US Department of
Agriculture webpage.m2 Since the collection of economic data taken over time has some form of
random variation, a technique of smoothing or moving average is used in order to reduce the
random variation effect.
Gizachew Tiruneh has included many variables, such as economic development, domestic
investment, economic openness, privatization, external debt, foreign aid, population growth,
ethnic fractionalization, and political stability in order to see the impact of these variables on
economic growth.' 03 Many of the studies related to economic growth have arrived at different
101 World Development Indicators. The World Bank. Available at:
http://ddpxt.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers (November 2009)
''`'United States Department of Agriculture, Available at:
www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/Data/ProjectedRealGDPValues.xls
"Gizachew Tiruneh, "Regime Type and Economic Growth in Africa: A Cross National Analysis," The Social











results due to the differences in the quantitative techniques and the data they have used. For
instance, Tiruneh uses Ordinary Least Squares estimators and he found that the influence of
regime type has some but not a strong impact on African economic growth.1 04 According to his
outcome, domestic investment showed itself to be statistically significant. Domestic investments
may be related to the creation of jobs, improvements in infrastructure, and more growth
opportunities for business. He also found that the education variable has no effect on economic
growth in Africa. One reason for these results could be the lack of job opportunity and few
numbers of skilled people.
The analysis correlating the variables of foreign domestic investment, official development
assistance and official aid, and total debt service with economic growth demonstrates how strong
they are compared to regime dynamics. The findings show that early and late democracies are
more strongly correlated with economic growth than the other variables of foreign domestic
investment, official development assistance and official aid, and total debt service (see table 5).
On the other hand, when looking at autocracies maintaining their status and liberalizing
autocracies, they are negatively correlated with economic growth (see table 4). Thus, it means
that autocracies maintaining and liberalizing autocracies do not generate economic growth but,
instead they have a reverse effect on growth, generating economic stagnation or decline. Foreign
domestic investment, official development assistance and official aid have stronger impacts on
African economic growth compared to autocracies and liberalizing autocracies. It is important to
explain that in the regression the unit of analysis is the categories of regime dynamics for each
year. For instance, tables 4 and 5 show N equal 407 and 200 respectively, the later means that 10
countries are categorized as early and late maintaining democracies multiplied by the period of
20 years considered in this analysis. In the case of table 4 it is noted that the sample size is equal


























It is well known that African countries have been performing not very well economically
compared to other countries. However, exceptions are represented by Botswana and Mauritius.
These two countries represent democratic and economic success in Africa. Before the end of the
Cold War three countries were considered democracies: Botswana, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe.











1980. However, the only maintaining democracies were Botswana and Mauritius. These two
countries have also sustained their levels of economic growth over time.
Many scholars have also compared the African context to other regions in order to identify the
causes of small growth among African economies in relation to other regions of the world.
Scholars, such as Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, have analyzed the slow rates of
growth in the African continent and found that poor economic policies have played an important
role in generating slow growth. 105 Among these economic policies, the lack of openness to the
international markets is one of the most important factors contributing to Africa's small growth.
They also argue that geographical factors such as the lack of access to the sea and a tropical
climate have also contributed to this situation. 106  Other researchers also argue that the challenges
to develop Africa's economy have to do with its colonial history, ethnic and tribal divisions,
climate and geography. Therefore, these authors argue that these aspects contribute to explaining
Africa's slow growth during the past 30 years compared to other regions of the world.
Sachs and Warner suggest that African countries have been performing worse than other
developing countries on many economic policy variables, such as openness to international trade,
average annual inflation, and national saving rates.107 These negative economic policies are also
affected by a series of natural disadvantages, such as a larger fraction of landlocked countries, a
higher fraction of area in tropical latitudes (with implications for disease, soil quality, and other
climatic factors), higher dependence on natural resources, and greater ethno linguistic
fractionalization. Landlocked countries, in particular, face very high costs of shipping, since they
must pay road transport costs across at least one international boundary in addition to shipment
costs.
Openness encourages greater efficiency in the allocation of the economy's scarce resources, and
also promotes market competition and thus helps reduce monopolies. Moreover, trade is often a
105 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies" Journal of African













vehicle for the importation of technical innovations and improvements, which serves to raise
total factor productivity in the entire economy, permitting technological diffusion from abroad
and increasing the national efficiency and competitiveness. They found that ethnic diversity does
not enter the growth regressions significantly. According to their results if ethnic diversity
matters, it does so by causing poorer policies. However, when controlling the policies, ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation has no further effect on growth. In bivariate regressions, ethnic
diversity is significantly correlated with openness and institutional quality. Specifically, more
ethnically diverse countries were less likely to be open during the study period between 1965 and
90 and tended to have poorer institutions. 108
Findings 1: Democracy leads to economic growth
The first important analysis to consider in this research has to do with whether democracy leads
to economic growth. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the average levels of economic growth
before and after a country has established its' first free and fair elections. I selected the countries
that are listed as early maintaining democracy (ear main) and had their first free and fair
elections in the beginning of the 1990s. The countries are Benin, Cape Verde, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Seychelles, and South Africa. The findings demonstrate that the average levels of
economic growth are higher after countries have their free and fair elections and maintain their
democratic status. The analysis in figure 1 illustrates the case of Benin and Cape Verde. Both
countries had their first free and fair elections in 1991 and they have maintained their democratic
status. These two countries have also increased their annual growth rates after 1991 (see figure
1). The graph in figure 2 also shows the same pattern for Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, and South
Africa. Mali had its' first free and fair election in 1992, Seychelles in 1993, Malawi,
Mozambique, and South Africa in 1994. These countries, except for Seychelles, have increased
their annual growth rates after 1993. Mozambique presents the highest increment of 2.3 average












Figure 1: Average Levels of Economic Growth before and after First Free and Fair










Figure 2: Average Levels of Economic Growth before and after First Free and Fair











Table 6: Model Summary and Coefficients
Model Summary
R 	 Adjusted R Std. Error of the
Model Square Square Estimate
.330a 	.109 .103 2.982
a. Predictors: (Constant), foreign domestic investment (current U S$), regime
type, total debt service (percentage of goods, services, and income), official




B Std. Error Beta T Sig.
(Constant) 2.882 0.239 12.038 0.000
Early and Late Maintaining
1.169 0.259 0.175 4.517 0.000Democracy
Total debt service (Percentage of
-0.035 0.009 -0.151 -3.892 0.000goods, services and income)
Official development assistance and
1.433-9 0.000 0.218 5.527 0.000official aid (current US$)
Foreign domestic investment
0.000 0.000 0.065 1.650 0.099(current US$)
a. Dependent Variable: AGR (average growth rates) smoothing average technique
The empirical results displayed in the table above suggests that regime dynamics, more
specifically, early and late maintaining democracies have a statistically significant effect on
economic growth. This result indicates that democracy does perform better than authoritarian
regimes. Foreign domestic investment (FDI) is not statistically significant. Extraction of Africa's
natural resources accounts for the spread of FDI flows across the continent. The 24 African











for close to three quarters of annual FDI flows over the past two decades. As a consequence, FDI
goes particularly in the strategic resources' infrastructure, but a small portion of its earnings is
reinvested. Total debt service is statistically significant and its' negative sign is in the expected
direction, Standardized Coefficient Beta is — 0.151. Therefore, highly indebted countries tend to
have less economic growth compared to the ones that are less in debt. It might be due the fact
that countries that are highly in debt need to spend a vast amount of their revenues in order to
pay back the credits. The variable of official development assistance and official aid is also
statistically significant, having some effects on Africa's economic growth.
The study of regime type and economic growth is still a sensitive topic in sub-Saharan Africa,
since many non-democratic regimes are still in power. Moreover, many donors do not
differentiate between democratic and authoritarian regimes when giving aid to African
countries. 109 As a consequence, these regimes are maintaining their status since there is not a
strong position against them by the international community. As some of the findings of this
research demonstrate, authoritarian regimes are actually growing, however, their economy is
based on the exploration of natural resources, such as the production of oil. Other studies on the
topic of economic growth and regime types, such as Halperin et al., show that authoritarian
regimes may grow at the same level as democracies. 110 However, they grow without improving
material and social welfare and generating economic development.
On the other hand, democracies are more sensitive in creating prosperity and improving the
human development aspects. Moreover, democracy excels because it depends on the support of
ordinary citizens that make demands and participate in the political game. It also excels because
it generates a set of rules, transparency, and accountability that increase people's democratic
support. "
"Joseph Siegle, "Democratic Divergence in Africa: Lessons and Implications for Aid" Workshop: Africa Beyond
Aid (April 3-4, 2006).
110 Halperin et al., op. cit.
"'Michael Bratton and Eric C. Chang, "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards,











Findings 2: Overall, democracies performance better when controlling oil producers
The results of the empirical analysis presented in this chapter shows that democracies and
autocracies have different effects on economic performances. The cross national findings,
through the aggregate average of annual growth between 1988 and 2008 (see figure 3), show
higher growth for autocracies (5.0) compared to democracies that have started their process of
democratization until 1997, represented by the early maintaining democracies (4.8). However,
autocracies that have maintained their status and early maintaining democracies are growing
more than liberalizing authoritarian regimes and late democratizers that are maintaining their
status.
The bar graph in figure 3 also demonstrates that autocracies that are liberalizing have their
growth rate average higher than late democracies. The worse performance is represented by early
and late interruptions in the process of democratizing. This first analysis suggests that the
duration of regimes is linked with economic performance. Countries that have sustained their
regimes over time tend to generate better economic performances compared to the ones that have
been interrupted. The assumption here is that the stability is generated when a regime lasts over
time. In this case political stability is linked with growth, despite regime types (see figure 3).
Thus, the likelihood of economic growth for early democracies and long term autocracies is
higher compared to late maintaining democracies and early and late democratizers that have had
their democratic process interrupted. As a consequence, this first analysis demonstrates that
political stability is crucial to economic growth.
However, political stability in rule based democracies differs from autocracies based on an
environment of coercion and clientelism. First of all, Staffan Lindberg points out that in these
new democracies, the repetitiveness of elections, as part of the democratic system, account for
much more than a procedural mechanism. 112 According to Lindberg, elections generate a broader
impact on democracy than is currently taken into consideration. 113 For him, the establishment of












multi-party elections engenders liberalization and the repetitiveness of electoral activities leads
to transformations and improvements in the democratic system. 114 Lindberg also points out that
when a government breaks down, it usually happens just after the first election and after
celebrating continuous second and third elections, regimes are more likely to survive. 115 His
conclusion is that a sequence of elections contributes to the democratization process, and more
specifically it forges civil rights and liberties in a country. Therefore, in an environment where
freedom and rights exist, accountability, transparency, and rule of law are more probable to
emerge. Democracy also favored the economic activities of the society by protecting ownership
and generating property rights. 116 Democracy does a better job as an instrument for solving and
managing potential and existing conflicts of interest through the application of the law.
On the other hand, the African case illustrates that authoritarian regimes tend to generate growth
based on the exploitation of natural resources, such as oil, gold, and diamonds. Therefore, their
economy is based on the commerce of strategic resources and investments in infrastructures are
concentrated on this primary sector. The African case differs from the Asian economic
performance, since the latter's growth is based on investments in infrastructure, technology, and
human capital. It is well known that African authoritarian regimes are based on an informal and
personalistic system of neo-patrimonialism, in which the political elites are engaged in vertical
networks of loyalties and privileges. Patron-client relationship is also extended into many sectors
of the society, where, in order to get access to jobs and resources they provide support and
loyalty to patrimonial leaders.
The differences between democracies and authoritarian regimes, regarding their overall
performance in sub-Saharan Africa, make it clear why donors must support and promote
democratization in Africa. Neo-patrimonial regimes are avoiding investing in their countries and
promoting economic development in order to maintain their personal power. Moreover, most of
the economic growth in authoritarian regimes is concentrated on political elites and important
supporters. In some cases, non-democratic regimes may hold elections, but it is just a façade.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.











Elections are flawed and used as an instrument to show structural and political changes to the
international community in order to continue receiving foreign aid maintaining the same elite in
power. Robert Mugabe is an example of this situation in Zimbabwe where the institutions of
democracy are in place, but they are manipulated by this powerful man.















Early Interruption Democracy (ear_inte) 168 2.22
Early Maintaining Democracy (ear_main) 231 4.80
Late Interruption Democracy (lat_inte) 63 2.22
Late Maintaining Democracy (lat_main) 42 2.40
Maintaining Autocracy (main_auto) 294 5.0
Liberalizing Autocracy (libe_auto) 189 3.29
Total 987 3.32
The next empirical analysis (see figure 4) takes into consideration oil producing countries. 117 In
this case I am not including the oil producers in my analysis. The reason to consider oil
producers is because they might be an important intervening variable affecting economic growth
among authoritarian regimes. The results show that when controlling oil producers or not
including them in the model, authoritarian regimes do not perform better than early maintaining
democracies. In this case, for early maintaining democracies their average annual growth is
higher than for autocracies, being 4.8 for the former and 3.5 for the latter. Liberalizing
autocracies also perform better than closed autocracies. Late maintaining democracies perform as
well as early interruption and late interruption has the worst scores overall (see figure 4).
117 Oil producers are represented by Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Mauritania,











In addition, since most of these non-democratic countries are still immersed in a patron-client
system, public revenues from the oil industry have been largely used to maintain the support of
their regimes through special access to jobs, resources, and other opportunities to loyal members.
Therefore, this finding illustrates that economic growth in authoritarian regimes is due to the oil
revenues and other natural resources. It also shows that they are strongly dependent on strategic
resources and the autocracies that are not oil producers tend to perform much worse. On the
other hand, democracies are shown to have a better economic performance and generate growth
even in the case that they do not produce strategic natural resources.
Moreover, another criticism regarding authoritarian countries' oil dependency is that they do not
use oil revenues to invest in infrastructures and human capital. Nevertheless, democracies
perform better since political leaders tend to invest in productive activities as part of their
agenda. Mass participation in the democratic system makes political elites more sensitive to the
demands of the citizens. According to Tiruneh, directed investment is one of the most important
sources of economic growth. 118 Direct investments flowing into productive channels represent
improvements in technology, infrastructures, human capital, and so on. These improvements lead
to the modernization of the country, a better environment for business with the creation of more
jobs, and foreign investments.
Early maintaining democracies tend to perform better than autocracies in regards to economic
growth when controlling oil producers. Moreover, they also rank higher in the United Nations -
Human Development Index (HDI). 119 Mauritius has a high score in the HDI and South Africa,
Botswana, Namibia, and Ghana have a medium score. On the other hand, most of the
authoritarian regimes score lower in the HDI. Furthermore, poverty and famine are strong linked
with authoritarian regimes. As Amartya Sen has argued, even in democracies with little civil
liberties and political freedom, politicians tend to be more accountable and perform better than in
closed regimes since public expectations translate into votes. 120 Democracy also serves as a
118 Tiruneh, op. cit.
119 United Nations Development Program, Human Development report 2007/2008 — Fighting Climate Change:
Human Solidarity in a Divided World (2007).











"protective role" for development by preventing famines and other disasters through the increase
flow of information.
Figure 4: The Average Levels of Economic Growth not including the Oil Producers in sub-











Table 8: Average Levels of economic Growth by Regime Dynamics without including the




Early Interruption Democracy (ear inte) 147 2.5
Early Maintaining Democracy (ear main) 231 4.85
Late Interruption Democracy (lat inte) 42 1.4
Late Maintaining Democracy (lat main) 42 2.50
Maintaining Autocracy (main auto) 126 3.5
Liberalizing Autocracy (libe auto) 147 3.80
Total 735 3.09
These findings demonstrate that good economic performance of authoritarian regimes depends
strongly on the exploitation of natural resources, in this case oil. When controlling it, these
countries are not experiencing high levels of economic growth compared to democracies. In this
analysis liberalizing autocracies are also performing better than closed autocracies, suggesting
that centralized authoritarian regimes and oil exploitation might be related to the maintenance of
these regimes, showing that they are extremely dependent on oil revenues. The exploitation of
natural resources might also be related to the durability of many authoritarian regimes in Africa
and in some aspect responsible for the delayed transition to democracy. Therefore, the
modernization argument, made by Lipset, those different levels of economic development is a











consideration many sub-Saharan African countries.
121
 In sub-Saharan Africa, oil has an
economic impact on maintaining authoritarian regimes instead of generating regime break down.
Moreover, with the rising oil prices, most of the oil producing countries have increased their
revenues.
Another important finding provided in figure 5 illustrates that early maintaining democracies
performed much better than autocracies during the late 1980s and early 1990s. However,
autocracies performed better in the subsequent years. An interesting finding is that late
maintaining democratizers (democratic transition after 1997) started growing after 2002, from
0.5 during the early 1990s to 4.0 after 2002. Thus, once again the modernization theory, which
affirms that economic growth happening under authoritarian regimes leads to democracy or that
economic growth is a condition to the democratic transition does not correspond to the African
reality. These results show that economic growth has happened when a country was already
democratic. One possible explanation is that the democratic experiment brings an environment of
certainty regarding the leaders' obedience to the rule of law and respecting democratic
institutions.
Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young argue that institutions, principally electoral systems, are
beginning to have weight for African leaders and it is a significant step in African
democratization. 122 Posner and Young compare the institutionalization of the electoral system
after decolonization in the early 1960s until 1980s, and they arrive at the conclusion that most of
the African leaders have left the government through a coup, assassination, or other forms of
violent overthrow. 123 Nonetheless, since the 1990, the greater part has left office accompanied by
formal institutional rules. From 2000 to 2005, just 19% of the rulers have left power through
irregular means. 124 Institutionalization of the electoral system is the first step in the political
development because it is the main and, in many cases, the only mechanism of public
121 •Upset, op. cit.
122 Daniel Posner and Daniel Young. "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa," Journal of Democracy













participation in Africa. It also demonstrates the primary source of checks against unlimited
executive power.
According to Posner and Young, the reasons why executive leaders feel more constraint now
than before are due to the roles played by public opinion in many countries in Africa. They are
becoming much more sensitive and conscious of the leader's performance. 125 Secondly, donors
of foreign aid are exerting more pressure on governments and in countries that presidents have
tried to secure third terms. The average amount of aid for those who attempted to stay in power
was 7.3 % of GDP, whereas for those who did not it was 12.1 % of GDP. 126 Nonetheless,
elections reflect the adherence of formal rules in Africa, however, they do not refer to the formal
institutional rules inside office and which have to do with laws, procedures, and regulations that
make the governmental machine function based on accountability, transparency, and rule of law.













Figure 5: Economic Growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 1988-2008
Findings 3: The level of democracy affects growth
Nonetheless, the comparison of economic growth over time favored early democratizer countries
(maintaining democratic status over time) when controlling oil producers (see figure 6). Early
democratizers perform better during the entire period of analysis. After 2002, late democratizers
also exceed autocracies and liberalizing autocracies. The empirical evidence, showed in this
research, questioned the argument that political regimes are irrelevant for growth. It also











leads to democracy and not the other way around. 127 As it was already stated, the modernization
argument does not take into consideration the reality of sub-Saharan Africa since the levels of
economic growth for early and late democratizers increased after 1995 (see figure 6). The bar
graph (see figure 6) illustrates that democracy does a better job regarding economic performance
and the issue of timing also influences growth. It means that early maintaining democracies over
time tend to have higher economic growth compared to late maintaining democracies. The
assumption formulated here is that democracies that have started their transition before 1997
have strong formal institutions, in which governmental machines are functioning based on the
rule of law, accountability, and transparency. Therefore, political performance might be
associated with economic performance, since it generates an environment of predictability and
guarantees private property ownership, domestic and foreign investments, and economic
openness.
On the other hand, late maintaining democratizers are still in a process of building democratic
institutions and in most cases building the institutions of the modern state. Bratton and Chang
argue that state-building and democratization in Africa must be seen as a connected phenomenon
that is happening simultaneously and both processes are reinforcing each other. 128 They argue
that a capable and legitimate state is not only a precondition for successful democratization, but,
reciprocally, is itself also "a product of the installation of democracy". 129 In short, the processes
of state building and democratization are best viewed neither as occurring forwards or backwards
but, rather, reciprocally or together. African cases suggest that democracy is being installed
backwards or in some cases it is happening mutually with democratization i.e. South Africa.
Bratton and Chang cited Rose and Shin who elaborate the stateness argument as follows: "While
free elections are necessary, they are not sufficient for democratization. In many third-wave
democracies, something is missing, but what is it? The short answer is: the basic institutions of
the modern state."130
127
Inglehart, Ronald and Welzel, Christian. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human
Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).













Indeed, levels of democracy are related to the strength of the state. Thus, types of regime systems
in Africa are an important way to look at the issues of ethnicity. Stateness means the strength of
the polity and the problem of African countries is that elections are been established in countries
that have not consolidated these basic institutions, in few cases one can say that these institutions
in fact exist, such as the cases of South Africa, Botswana, and Mauritius. However, a variety of
political regimes can be found in Africa. Bratton and Chang use Freedom House Index from
2004 in order to classify regimes. 131 According to their results, 15 African regimes were
democracies, 27 were different types of autocracies, and 6 were categorized as hybrid regimes.
In these 15 democracies, they argue that just 5 countries representing 7 percent of the continent's
population are categorized as liberal democracies, meaning that they respect civil and political
rights of the people. 132 Ten countries are considered electoral democracies, meaning that free and
fair elections are established but civil rights and freedom are not strongly secure.
Six countries are considered hybrid regimes that are not democratic or authoritarian. As
Diamond notes "more regimes than ever before are adopting the form of electoral democracy,
but fail to meet the substantive test." 133 The last category is formed by liberalized autocracies and
unreformed autocracies. In this case, elections are there, but they are a mere façade. Moreover,
these countries are involved in internal conflicts, such as the cases of Somalia and Congo-
Kinshasa.
At this point, a comparative analysis between African regime types and characteristics of state
are important in order to see the connection between these two variables. Bratton and Chang
have empirically analyzed the relationship between stateness and regime type and their findings
show that they are positively and significantly connected. 134 Their results show that of the five
countries with the highest levels of stateness, four are liberal democracies i.e. Botswana, Cape
Verde, Mauritius, and South Africa and the other is an electoral democracy i.e. Namibia. At the
other end of the scale, African countries with low levels of stateness are characterized principally
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
'33 Diamond, op. cit. p22.











by political instability, and many have experienced civil wars. They say that "although countries
such as Angola, Burundi, Nigeria, and Sudan score low on all governance dimensions, their
primary shortcoming is that governments have yet to establish reliable control over
territories". 135 They also conclude that these states do not have conditions conducive to
democracy. The link between the strength of state and democracy is important since it is related
to the issue of political order happening through legal means. The authors also mention that a
functioning democracy has never emerged in any of Africa's weaker states. In short, weaker
states are likely to end up as autocratic or hybrid political systems.
Public opinion data from Afrobarometer offers an important tool in order to identify which
qualities of state are more prone to the emergence of democracy. 136 The variable supply for
democracy, measured by individual opinions on satisfaction with democracy and the extent of
democracy, shows that enforcement of the rule of law is the most important characteristic in a
democratic state, because it also provides safety from crime and violence. 137 It also indirectly
shows the commitment and responsive of the leaders. Public opinion data shows that the state's
capacity to deliver social and economic goods does not translate into popular support and
democratic satisfaction, but violations of the rule of law are perceived as worse on democratic
support. 138 Therefore, a functioning state requires a set of institutions that enforce law and order.
In this regard, strong institution makes democracy more likely and also makes the creation of
rule of law viable as partly a product of democracy. The case of African states is aggravated by
the establishment of informal institutions that coexist together with the formal institutions of
democracy. Patron-client networks also undermine the functioning of these formal institutions,
the rule of law and checks and balances.
The adherence to formal rules by the governments tends to improve with the continuous




138 Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton. (January 2007) "Learning About Democracy: Awareness, Performance and


















































much more than a procedural mechanism. 139 According to Lindberg, election generates a broader
impact on democracy than is currently taken into consideration. 140 For him, the establishment of
multi-party elections engenders liberalization and the repetitiveness of electoral activities leads
to transformation and improvement in the democratic system. Lindberg also points out that when
a government breaks down, it usually happens just after the first election and after celebrating
continuous second and third elections, regimes are more likely to survive. 141 His conclusion is
that a sequence of elections contributes to the democratization process, and more specifically it
forges civil rights and political liberties in a country.

















Among the liberalizing authoritarian regimes controlling the countries that are oil producers, the
ones that scores better on the Freedom House Index are the ones with long term growth. Doing a
Time Series Analysis (see figure 7) for the liberalizing authoritarian regimes, Tanzania and
Zambia are the ones that are sustaining their growth over time. A surprisingly case illustrated in
the graph is Ethiopia since it has been having an economic boom since 2000. Ethiopia's average
growth has moved from 4.0 to 10. It is an interesting case since Ethiopia's extremely robust
growth depends mostly on exporting agricultural crops, such as coffee, beans, and oilseeds.
World Bank's report shows that Ethiopia's growth is based on the escalation of public sector
investments, especially in infrastructure and social capital.
The next question to address is why late maintaining democracies are performing worse than
liberalizing authoritarian regimes when controlling oil producers. Two main reasons might
account for these results. First, late maintaining democracies have begun growing after 2002. Its
economic growth was higher compared to liberalizing authoritarian in the period after 2002.
Another reason that might account for these findings is due to the fact that Burundi was
immersed in a civil war from 1993 until 2004. Consequently, the recession that started during the
early 1990s was aggravated by the civil war, the embargo, and the reduction of the production of
coffee beans — its main source of revenue. On the other hand, Senegal had strong average growth






















Findings4: Early democracies produce greater economic stability
Figure 8: Economic Growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 1988-2008
In the time series analysis, the results show that early maintaining democracies have had a stable
economic growth compared to autocracies (figure 8). The average rate of annual economic
growth for democracies is 4.0. Authoritarian regimes that are liberalizing have also had a more
stable economic growth than autocracies and democracies that have democratized after 1997, but
have broken down. Overall, after 1995, autocracies tend to perform better than democracies.
However, when controlling oil producers, the average annual growth for early democratizing is
higher than for autocracies over time (see figure 9). Moreover, late democracies that have
interrupted their process of democratization show economic instability during the entire period of











achieved unless there is economic growth. 142 Indeed, African case demonstrates that democratic
stability is happening together with sustainable economic growth over time. Therefore, growth
is not a precondition to democracy but, instead, it is generated by democracy and democratic
stability might depend on the growth over time.
Figure 9: Economic Growth in sub-Saharan Africa without Including the Oil Producers,
1988-2008
In order to improve the analysis about economic stability, this study looks at economic
fluctuation over time. Countries were classified according to their regime type for each year.
They were classified as democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies based on the Freedom











House Index from 1988 to 2008. The results show that the average of economic annual growth
for democracy is 4.03 and democratic countries show smaller economic fluctuation compared to
other regimes, the standard deviation is 2.26. The average annual growth for hybrid regimes is
3.17 and their standard deviation is 5.56. Autocracies have a slightly higher mean compared to
hybrid regimes, however, their standard deviation is also higher 6.04. This analysis demonstrates
that democracies have a higher economic growth, and their growth is stable over time compared
to hybrid regimes and autocracies when using aggregate mean between 1988 and 2008.
Table 8: The Average Levels of Economic Growth by Regime Type between 1988 and 2008
Report




Democracy 4.0377 254 2.26472
Report




hybrid regime 3.1749 138 5.56929
Report















Findings 5: Investments: an intervening variable
Investments in infrastructure are an important variable to look at briefly, since regime type might
generate differences in growth rates due to different types of investments. Unfortunately, the
infrastructure data is not available for the majority of sub-Saharan African countries. As a result,
this study cannot provide the empirical analysis related to investment that might be an
intervening variable between democracy and economic growth. Therefore, this analysis will be
theoretical and based on previous studies from the World Bank. The differences between
democracies and autocracies might be due to the fact that democracies invest more on
infrastructure and human capital than do authoritarian regimes. Moreover, infrastructure might
be the engine promoting the increment in GDP rates in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, democracy
might affect economic growth by affecting certain factors, such as investments in human capital
and infrastructure. Democracy generates an economic stability and growth by investing in areas
that generate a sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, democracy, in most of the cases,
generates an environment of more predictability due to its political stability through the design of
micro and macroeconomic policies, protection of private property rights, and so on. A recent
study conducted in 24 African countries shows that the poor state of infrastructures in Sub
Saharan Africa, especially its electricity, water, roads, and information and communications
technology (ICT), are responsible for cutting national economic growth by 2 percentage points
every year and reducing business productivity by as much as 40 percent. 143
Infrastructures are represented by the basic set of structures that are necessary to promote
development and social well-being. They are mainly represented by power, transport, irrigation,
water and sanitation, and information and communication technology (ICT). The focus of
analysis in this part of the study is whether infrastructure is affected by regime type in sub-
Saharan Africa. The argument here is that different regime types might invest in infrastructure in
different proportions. According to the World Bank "infrastructure has been responsible for
more than half of Africa's recent improved growth performance and has the potential to
143 Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia eds., "Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation". The











contribute even more in the future." 144 The empirical analysis has shown that democracy and
autocracy categories do influence economic growth, it would be interesting to develop new
research on what is promoting the sustainable economic growth for early maintaining
democracies — it might be due to their investments in infrastructure. The main idea of looking at
investment in infrastructure is because it is the engine to develop and sustain growth. In general,
World Bank's report found out that the development of infrastructure in Africa is behind those of
other developing countries. 145 This  negative scenario also has a drastic consequence in
promoting regional integration. Their findings also include that, on average, Africa's
infrastructure services are twice as expensive compared to elsewhere. This situation plays against
the modernization of Africa's infrastructure and a lack of competition regarding infrastructure
services.
The World Bank's report on Africa's infrastructure found that Africa's difficult economic
geography presents a challenge for infrastructure development. The main constraints regarding
Africa's geography is related to low overall population density (36 people per square kilometer),
low rates of urbanization (35 percent), but relatively rapid rates of urban growth (3.6 percent a
year), a relatively large number of landlocked countries (15), and several small economies. The
continent also experiences high hydrological variability and is the continent most affected by the
climate change, however, it has the lowest levels of emissions. 146 Another problem facing sub-
Saharan Africa is that the infrastructure to connect intraregional countries is very low when
looking at transcontinental highway links and power interconnectors of fiber-optic backbones.
This situation is especially problematic for small countries that might depend on the goods and
services exchange from neighboring countries. Moreover, small and landlocked countries face
problems since "most continuous transport corridors are concerned with providing access to
seaports, whereas the intraregional road network is characterized by major discontinuities. Few
cross-border interconnectors exist to support regional power exchange, even though many
countries are too small to produce power economically on their own." 147














The middle income democracies, like Cape Verde, South Africa, and Mauritius are also ranked
in a better position regarding their infrastructures. Non-democratic countries, especially the ones
that are emerging from conflict, such as Ivory Coast and Democratic Republic of Congo, have a
lack of infrastructure also because many of their installations were destroyed during the civil
wars. Such countries would, on average, need to spend 37 percent of their GDPs to infrastructure
in order to build a solid infrastructure platform. 148 With their difficult environments, they attract
relatively little external financing, capturing only 10 percent of overseas development assistance
and 6 percent of private capital flows allocated to infrastructure. In addition to their huge
financing burden, the fragile states do not use their current resources well; they underspend on
maintenance and have inefficient service providers. 149 In the Democratic Republic of Congo,
about 50 percent of infrastructure assets need rehabilitation. Resource-rich countries could meet
their infrastructure spending needs for a more manageable price tag of about 12 percent of
GDP. 150 Moreover, the large royalty payments they received during the recent commodity boom
provided a ready source of finance. Yet resource rich countries actually lag behind non fragile
low income countries in their infrastructure stocks and spend less on infrastructure. They have
been devoting their added wealth not to infrastructure development but to paying off debts.
This study argues that well functioning infrastructure is essential to Africa's economic
performance and that improving inefficiencies and reducing waste could result in major
improvements in the lives of the African people. Democracies lead to a more sustainable
economic growth but they might depend strongly on which policies democratic regimes carry out
and which policies tend to promote prosperity. A high level of public investment in infrastructure















It is noted that there are several indices for measuring democracy. The idea of using Freedom
House Index was to provide data in order to create a model sensitive to the meaning of
democracy in Africa. The improvements and setbacks for freedom and rights are very
pronounced in Africa and these aspects are close related to the quality of democracy and
autocracy in African governments. However, there is common criticism regarding the
measurement of democracy by Freedom House, since it uses a dichotomous index that one size
fit all. In this regard, countries are categorized as being democracy or not. Nevertheless, this
weakness was overcome by dividing the countries into levels of democracy and autocracy.
However, the six categories and the 1997 cut line defining early and late democracies and
autocracies were developed arbitrarily in this study. Consequently, it might also lead to biased
outcomes.
The question of causality was also raised about what leads to economic growth taking into
consideration the relationship between regime dynamics and economic growth. The empirical
evidence for legitimating the inference of cause-effect relationship was demonstrated in this
study through the analysis of the average levels of economic growth before and after a country
has established its first free and fair election. Above all, the countries that have maintained their
democratic status have increased their economic growth after holding subsequences free and fair
elections. However, the issues of causality are not easy to demonstrate when countries have
periods of democratic interruptions. A more specific analysis should be done in the future,
looking at each country and its economic growth before and after democratic interruptions. I
suggest that a study case would be the best tool to do it.
The foregoing analysis found that the more democratic the country is, the higher its level of
economic growth is when controlling oil producers. The important implication of these findings
is that it provides empirical support against the argument that democracy does not generate
economic growth because of the adverse effect of popular participation and the rise of demands.











sustaining their economic growth. The practical implications of these findings are that the spread
of democracy that has occurred in underdeveloped countries in the beginning of the 1990s is
generating superior economic performance.
The newly established democratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa show that democracy is a long
run process and its stability and sustainability influences economic growth. Therefore, an
environment of political stability is an essential item for economic growth. Political uncertainty,
represented by early and late interruptions, has a negative impact on economic growth since it
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